Justification of Punishment
Retributivism:
Punishment is justified because people deserve it for acting
immorally/past-looking
I.
Retribution
a. Degrees
of culpability based on circumstance
i. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens: murder of shipmate for food;
was it less morally wrong b/c of circumstance?
ii. U.S. v. Bergman: wealthy banker
defrauding govt.; was this more morally wrong b/c of his status and advantages?
II.
Idea of proportionality of punishment
Utilitarianism:
Punishment is justified because it serves a purpose/forward-looking
I.
Deterrence:
Reduction of future crime
a. Specific
deterrence: D decides not to
commit future crimes
b. General
deterrence: Other people see
punishment, decide not to commit crime
i. Regina v. Dudley
ii. U.S. v. Bergman
iii. U.S. v. Jackson: is there a difference in deterrence from
life imprisonment and a very long sentence? (concurring)
II.
Incapacitation:
prevention from re-offending
a. Punish
every offender equally or
b. Attempt
to identify potential re-offenders and incapacitate them
i. Question
of fairness
ii. Sentences
based on individual characteristics
1. U.S. v. Jackson: career bank robber given life sentence for
prevention – did not consider age
a. Would
he really rob once he is old (concurring)?
c. Does
not have to be in traditional form of jail
III.
Rehabilitation:
offenders can be changed/treated
a. Idea
that crime is psychological disturbance
b. Individuality
IV.
General Critiques of Utilitarianism:
a. Not
fair to use defendant’s for greater purpose
Related Ideas:
I.
Justification v. Excuse
a. Justification:
sometimes w/ justification it is said that no crime has been committed
i. Self-defense
b. Excuse:
crime was committed, but person is excused; circumstances of compulsion can
excuse a person
i. Insanity,
mental illness
II.
Should punishment consider individual factor such as
age/race?
a. U.S. v. Jackson
III.
Public shaming
IV.
Extraordinary Family Circumstances
a. U.S. v. Johnson: mother w/ four young children’s sentence
reduced b/c of “extraordinary” family responsibilities
b. Utilitarian:
looking at family situations – greater good of society
c. Retribution:
less culpability when there is good excuse
Criminal Conduct: Culpability
Actus reus plus mens
rea
Actus Reus (objective –
voluntary act)
Voluntary Conduct – willed by actor
Elements (MPC §1.13):
I.
Conduct:
physical behavior of D
a. All
crimes must have conduct element (act or omission)
b. MPC: §2.01(1): only
liable for voluntary acts or omission to perform act of which person is
physically capable
i. Voluntary
v. involuntary acts under MPC
1. Habit:
voluntary
2. Possession:
voluntary only with awareness
3. Hypnosis:
involuntary
4. Sleepwalking:
involuntary
c. Martin v. State: police brought drunk man to highway; court
ruled act must be voluntary to be crime
d. People v.
Newton: man kills police
officer when unconscious; not voluntary so not culpable
e. People v.
Decina: man kills another b/c
he has epileptic seizure while driving; aware of condition and voluntarily
drove so culpable
f. Robinson v. California: status
of narcotics addict – whether addiction is crime; No, cannot punish people for thoughts (cruel and unusual
punishment)
g. Powell v.
Texas: builds on Robinson; alcoholic drunk in public can
be punished; not unconstitutional to punish for act that is compelled by the
disease of addiction
i. up
to state law – states can pass legislation that makes acting on addiction an
involuntary act and thus, not punishable
II.
Circumstance:
objective fact or condition
III.
Result:
consequence/outcome of conduct
Omission
I.
MPC §2.01(3): No liability for omission unless (a) “the omission
is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (b)a duty to
perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law”
a. Pope v. State: woman not culpable for child abuse when she
watched mother beat child to death b/c she was not responsible for supervision
of child under statute, thus no legal obligation
b. No
duty for good Samaritan behavior
c. Jones v. U.S.: whether woman who failed to nourish child at
her house had duty to act
i. Duty
to act when: 1) there is a statute that obligates you to care for another; 2)if
you stand in a certain relationship with the child (parent-child relationship);
3) if there is a contractual obligation; 4) or one has voluntarily assumed care
for another and has secluded that person
d. Barber v. Superior Court: act v. omission when doctor
removed patient from life support at family’s request (homicide?)
i. Omission
of further treatment – physician has no duty to continue treatment once it is
proven to be ineffective, so not homicide
ii. If
it was an act, it would be homicide
II.
MPC
§2.01(3)(b): crime if civil law imposes legal duty to act
Mens Rea
- Must look at mens rea for each element of the crime – D must have mens rea for each element to be convicted.
- Every statute does not always have circumstance, conduct and result. In an exam, identify which apply, then figure out which mens rea is required for each element. You can do this without looking at facts. Element analysis is not related to facts, but what is written into the statute. Once you look at the statute, you go to facts and figure out if D had the mens rea required in each element of the crime
- Culpable if you had a choice in conduct
- Difficult to prove state of mind, but criminal law is about subjective blameworthiness, except in case of negligence
- Must infer
Culpable Mental State (MPC § 2.02)
I.
Purposely:
§2.02(a), intends
to harm
a. Subjective
test
b. MPC
does away with difference between specific and general intent
c. Conduct:
(i) conscious intent to engage in conduct (the act)
d. Result:
(i) conscious intent to cause the result
e. Circumstance:
(ii) D purpose of circumstance if the D is “aware of existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist”
f. U.S. v. Neiswender: juror tried to bribe lawyer to get $, charged
with obstruction of justice, statute called for purpose of result, not
convicted b/c his purpose was to get $ not obstruct justice – so he actually
only had knowledge in respect to result if you apply the MPC
i. Court
used odd reasoning that you intend the natural consequences of your act to make
him liable – took what should have been mens rea of purpose and made it
negligence
g. Different
from motive, which asks “why?”
i. Good
motive is not a defense to purposeful mens rea
h. Conditional
intent
i. Holloway v. U.S.: carjacker intended to kill if necessary;
court said this was enough for intent – conditional purpose is purpose
1. Dissent
disagreed b/c the D did not want the circumstance to occur; possible solution
is saying conditional purpose is purpose if situation is likely to occur.
2. MPC §2.02(6): condition
irrelevant
II.
Knowingly:
§2.02(b), knows
result is likely to occur even if he does not consciously seek to cause the
result
a. Subjective
test – whether D actually knew
b. Conduct:
(i) aware conduct is of that nature
c. Circumstance:
(i) aware circumstances exist
d. Result:
(ii) practically certain conduct will cause the result
e. Risk
must be substantial and unjustifiable
f. “Willfully:”
§2.02(8), in statute often indicates knowledge as
mens rea unless statute otherwise indicates
g. Willful
blindness: §2.02(7),
aware of high probability of existence
i. U.S. v. Jewell: conscious avoidance of knowledge that car
had drugs in it; counts as knowledge
1. notice
that this seems like a recklessness standard
III.
Recklessness:
knowledge of risk, but conscious decision to ignore it
a. §2.02(c): “consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct”
b. Circumstance:
disregard risk that circumstance exists
c. Result:
disregard risk that result will follow from conduct
d. MPC:
Subjective test – aware of risk of harm stemming from conduct
i. Many
courts make it an objective test
e. Regina v. Cunningham: D broke gas meter, gas escaped,
harming neighbor
f. Risks
unacceptable if social good outweighs harm
g. Remember
to distinguish between reckless conduct and reckless result
IV.
Negligence:
not aware of risk but should have been
a. MPC:
objective standard
i. § 2,02(d), Failure to
perceive the risk is a gross deviation from standard of care a reasonable
person would have taken
b. Conduct:
should have known conduct would bring result
c. Circumstance:
should have known the circumstance existed
d. Result:
should have known result would occur
e. Controversy
over moral culpability
f. Civil
standard of negligence v. criminal standard
i. Criminal:
requires gross deviation from what reasonable person would do
ii. State v. Santillanes: accidental knife injury to child – question
whether this is child abuse; lower court wrongly used civil negligence standard
1. use
criminal negligence standard when statute does not say whether it requires
criminal or civil standard
2. nature
of risk must grossly deviate from reasonable conduct under criminal negligence
standard
V.
Motive
a. Usually
not relevant in criminal law to guilt, but can be relevant for sentencing
b. Asks
“Why”
c. Used
by prosecutor to bolster case
d. Sometimes
used as defense if it is reason for action in favor of D
i. Self
defense, duress, etc.
VI.
Applying Mens Rea
a. When
only one mens rea is identified in statute, apply it to all elements
b. If
plain words of statute do not specify mens rea, apply recklessness as standard
under the MPC §2.02(3)
– lower standard than Staples
i. MPC
requires subjective culpability w/ reckless standard
ii. U.S. v. Staples: man did not register automatic rifle as required by statute;
adopted knowingly as standard; man not guilty if he did not know (Supreme Court
and MPC differ on standard)
Mistake of Fact
I.
Common Law
a. Distinguishes
between mistake of fact and mistake of law
b. Specific
intent: if the statute is one of
specific intent, an unreasonable mistake negates the mens rea
c. General
intent: must be reasonable mistake to negate mens rea
II.
MPC:
Mistake of Fact or Law
a. Ignorance
of Law (MPC §2.02 (9))
i. Ignorance
of law is never an excuse – can’t defend by saying you did not know of
existence of the law
b. Mistake
of Law: Confusion regarding interpretation of the law
i. Different
from saying you weren’t aware there was a law, deals with misinterpreting facts
– D knows actions may be governed by law but concludes that they are not
illegal
c. Mistake
of Fact: Mistake over what
d. §2.04(1): “ignorance or
mistake as to matter of fact or law is a defense if (a) [it] negatives the
purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a
material element of the offense.”
i. Purpose/
knowledge/recklessness: any honest mistake of fact no matter how unreasonable
is defense and negates mens rea
1. D
says “did not know or intend”
2. Negligent
(unreasonable) mistake negates purpose/knowledge/reckless mens rea
ii. Negligence:
only reasonable (not negligent) mistake negates a negligent mens rea
iii. Remember
that whichever mens rea you are at, a mistake of a lower mens rea will negate
it
e.
Willfully blind treated as if you knew - §2.02(7)
III.
Regina v. Prince: 19th
Century England; man took girl away from father but believed she was of age; reasonable
mistake of fact but old court did not follow modern MPC standard, used strict
liability theory
a. Under
MPC, would have defaulted to recklessness for circumstance and reasonable
mistake would be enough to negate mens rea
IV.
People v. Olson:
mistake of fact about age of girl that had sex (statutory rape?), strict
liability b/c it is a statutory rape case
Strict Liability
I.
Statutes: No mens rea requirement for strict liability
crimes
a. Basically
liable regardless of circumstances and reasonableness
II.
MPC
§2.05 essentially rejects strict liability, only allows punishment via
fine based on statute
III.
Strict liability or mens rea?
a. Generally,
strict liability crimes are those which can put large portions of society at
risk – ex. (Commerce of food, meds, firearms, etc.) – used for protection of
consumers
i. Morisette v. U.S.: D honestly believed planes were
abandoned and rotting, took them; charged under fed. statute that makes knowing
conversion of govt. property a crime; lower court ruled on strict liability but
S.C. said this was wrong standard;
1. S.C.
said you must prove mens rea for all elements of crime, here they did not apply
it for circumstance
2. Example
where strict liability not applied
3. Strict
liability usually applied in public welfare offenses (see above)
b. Absent
clear rule that no mens rea is required, do not dispense of mens rea based on
public welfare rationale
i. U.S. v. Staples: D unaware gun was automatic; silence by
statute does not mean strict liability; do not assume strict liability if it
would criminalize broad range of seemingly innocent conduct (talks about
tradition of gun ownership)
c. Strict
liability crimes have lower penalties (fines)
i. Exceptions:
statutory rape, some felony murder
Rape
- Rape laws historically were about protecting women’s virginity; regarded women more as property
- Currently, rape law is more about sexual relations between men and women and what the criminal law’s role is in those relationships
- More focus on rape as crime of violence
- Violating rights
- Can be against male or female
Model Penal Code
I. MPC
§213
a. Expands
behavior that constitutes rape
b. Provides
for degrees of rape
c. Focuses
on behavior rather than internal thought process
d. But,
still does not use sex-neutral terms, maintains marital immunity, allows
mistake of age defense
e. Seems
to offer Ds protection
II. MPC
§213: Elements of rape
a. Sexual
intercourse
b. by
man w/woman not his wife
c. by
force or
d. by
threat of serious physical harm or kidnapping to victim or third person
III. MPC:
also rape in case of drugs or unconscious
IV. MPC:
1st v. 2nd Degree
a. Basic
is 2nd degree (§213.1(1)), but if D inflicts serious bodily harm on
victim or victim was not a “voluntary social companion of the actor . . . and
had not previously permitted him sexual liberties” it is 1st degree
rape
i. Can
be problematic for date rape cases
V. Statutes:
many are now gender-neutral, include more acts, shift from focus on subjective
thought process of D to objective conduct; many retain spousal immunity
Actus Reus: Look to
the statutes for the elements of the crime (not MPC)
I.
Result/Conduct: Sexual Intercourse
a. Definition
has been expanded in statutes and MPC
II.
Conduct: Force
a. Actual
force – Physical
i. State in the Interest of M.T.S.: (N.J) consensual
kissing/petting, not consensual intercourse; element of physical force met when
D used no more force than necessary for intercourse
ii. Men
have to use force if women resist
b. Threat
of force
i. Whose
point of view? D or P?
ii. Often
victim’s fear must be reasonable to count
iii. Nonphysical
threat:
1. State v. Thompson: (MT) principal threatens not to let
student graduate; ruling that intimidation is not “force” for purposes of rape;
statute did not say anything about consent so you could not argue that she did
not give consent
2. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich: threat to return victim to
juvenile detention center; not rape b/c no physical force
III.
Resistance
a. Not
always required by statute
b. Related
to whether she consented, whether force was used (men would have to use force
if woman resisted)
c. Brings
up issue: how does man know what woman wants and when she is resisting? Does no mean yes?
IV.
Circumstance: Consent
a. By
having consent as an element, it shifts focus to victim’s behavior rather than
D’s
i. Based
on victim’s Words and Actions
b. Non-consent?
i. In re John Z: (CA 2003) victim withdraws consent; rule that
withdrawal is the same as no consent; question as to the clarity of victim’s
withdrawal and the time frame for allowing D to stop
ii. Commonwealth v. Sherry: victim goes
home from party w/ guys, 3 have sex w/ her; D claims he did not know she did
not consent; subjective view of D is not defense – need to look objectively
iii. Do
you need to say “No”
iv. Do
you need actual physical resistance?
c. Can
be unclear
i. State v. Rusk: (Md.); D took car keys and lightly choked victim; lack of
consent was established even without specific words/actions on victim’s part –
court ruled that proof of failure to resist b/c of fear can establish lack of
consent
d. Statutory
Rape: cannot legally give consent
i. MPC allows for considering
D’s belief about age
e. Unconscious/mentally
incompetent people cannot give consent
V.
Circumstance: Deception
a. General
rule is that sex by deception is not rape
b. People v. Evans: D lied about conducting experiment and got
victim to have sex with him, not rape
c. Some
states allow affirmative defense where D must prove he thought victim consented
Mens
Rea
I.
Circumstance: Consent
a. Can
be difficult to establish D’s mens rea
b. Do
you prove D knew or should have known that woman did not consent?
II.
Look to statute
a. Under
MPC, default is recklessness, but many states have negligence standard (lower
than recklessness) which means D would be liable if he did not know but should
have
b. Consequence
of negligence standard: maybe men do not get to have as much sex as they would
like, but a higher standard might have a higher price – more victimization of
women
c. Strict
liability standard? Mistake of fact (consent) not a defense in MA
III.
Cases
a. Commonwealth v. Sherry:
b. Commonwealth v. Fischer: (PA); enacts strict liability and
does not allow D to defend on basis that he made a reasonable mistake
IV.
Conduct Force:
a. Did
he purposely force her?
b. Did
he force her with reckless mens rea?
Homicide
Murder
·
Statutory approach (degrees) and MPC approach
(no degrees)
·
Mainly looking at result element of death
(circumstance is that the victim was alive before the act)
·
Premeditation can be used to separate out
degrees
o
Appraoch #1: Premeditated murder more culpable
b/c of the time of planning
o
Approach #2: Some crimes are brutal that are not
premeditated – are they really less culpable? MPC says no. (see Anderson)
I.
Common law:
a. Original
definition: killing with malice aforethought
i. Intent
to kill, motivated by ill will (malice),
deliberate killing
1. also
encompasses reckless or wanton conduct (2nd degree)
ii. Includes
first and second degree
b. First Degree
i. Intentional
killing (malice aforethought) that
is premeditated, willful, and
deliberate
ii. Premeditation
1. not
necessarily long premeditation necessary
2. Commonwealth v. Carrol: (1963) man murders wife after she
nags and berates him; D argues he has good reputation and could not have
premeditated the murder; court says need some premeditation for 1st
degree but “no time is too short”
3. State v.
Guthrie: (1995) requirement of
more time for premeditation; need sufficient time between formation of intent
and actual killing; contrary to Carrol
4. State v. Forrest: man helps terminally ill father die; has
all mens rea requirements but is seemingly less morally culpable, but meets 1st
degree murder requirements
c. Second Degree
i. Intentional
killing (malice aforethought) that
is not premeditated
ii. Not
premeditated, deliberate, and willful
1. Anderson case: murder reduced from 1st to 2nd
degree when man brutally stabs girlfriend’s daughter; so brutal there is no
evidence of premeditation, raises questions about culpability because it is
less culpable than 1st degree but obviously very brutal – is D
really less culpable?
d. Provocation
(related to Manslaughter)
i. Adequate
provocation reduces murder to manslaughter under common law.
ii. Generally,
words are not adequate provocation to reduce from murder to manslaughter
iii. Standard:
would a reasonable person be inflamed to murder? If yes, then it is manslaughter
iv. Cooling
off: if you have time to cool off, provocation does not mitigate charge
v. Girouard v. State: (1991) man kills wife after she
questions his manliness and abilities in bed; court says words do not
constitute provocation to reduce crime from 2nd degree murder to
manslaughter
vi. Maher v. People : (1862) words were enough to be
provocation where man heard about wife’s adultery
vii. People v. Casassa: there is both subjective and objective
element when deciding whether to reduce from murder to manslaughter (subjective
re: whether D was under extreme emotional disturbance; objective re: whether
disturbance was reasonable)
1. raises
question about what factors to consider
II.
MPC
§210.2:
a. abolishes
distinction between first and second degree murder (rejects premeditation)
b. Uses
mens rea to separate murder and manslaughter
c. Mens
rea: purposely; knowingly; or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life
i. Gels
with common law in that any premeditated and deliberate homicide fits within
“purpose” or “knowing”
d. Must
subjectively recognize risk of death under MPC
e. Idea
of malice
f. Provocation
does not reduce to manslaughter as in common law
i. Not
provocation, but . . .
ii. §210.3(1)(b):
A killing that would otherwise be murder is manslaughter if it is “committed
recklessly” and “under extreme emotional
or mental disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”
Unintended
Killings (Manslaughter)
I.
Common law:
a. Unlawful
homicide without malice aforethought (no intent or knowledge action might cause
death or reckless disregard for life)
i. Difficult
distinction
ii. Mens
rea of reckless (wanton) conduct or negligence
b. Voluntary
v. Involuntary
i. Voluntary:
intentional killing mitigated by heat of passion, provocation – want to cause
death but you don’t have control of emotions
ii. Involuntary:
unintentional killing (reckless, negligent) without malice
c. Civil
v. Criminal Liability
i. Commonwealth v. Welansky: fire at nightclub; manslaughter
based on omissions and affirmative acts; reasonable person should have been
aware of risk
1. mens
rea wanton or reckless conduct for manslaughter
d. Objective
v. Subjective Standards of Liability
i. State v. Williams: negligent parents and child dies; ordinary
negligence enough to convict of involuntary manslaughter (usually need gross
negligence); did parents exercise reasonable care? Objective standard – w/
subjective parents may not have been convicted
e. Line
between Murder and Manslaughter
i. When
recklessness shows wanton disregard for life, it is murder (considered malice
aforethought)
1. Jury
decision, consider factors such as
a. Magnitude
of risk
b. D’s
awareness of risk
c. Justification
of risk
ii. Commonwealth v. Malone: boy shoots friend playing Russian
roulette; second degree murder rather than manslaughter; even though there was
no intent it was gross recklessness and enough to be murder b/c it showed
disregard for human life – although no intent, gross negligence showed reckless
wanton disregard
iii. U.S. v. Fleming: drunk driver
swerves and kills; second degree murder did not necessitate intent to kill;
wanton and gross deviation from reasonable conduct was enough – constitutes
malice aforethought
1. self-induced
intoxication not a defense (MPC agrees)
II.
MPC
§210.3
a. (a):
Homicide is manslaughter when committed recklessly (consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause the result)
b. Under
MPC, mens rea of recklessness (210.3)
i. With
these, if there is extreme disregard for life it is murder (jury determination,
see above)
ii. Self-induced
intoxication is no defense
c. No
provocation rule (see MPC above) – (c) replaced with extreme emotional
disturbance standard for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse to
change to manslaughter
i. I
think victim must be the person that harmed you for reduction of crime in this
instance, which is also the majority rule
d. Both
subjective and objective: (c) determining from the viewpoint of a person in the
D’s situation (objective) in the circumstances as D believed them to be
(subjective)
i. Issue:
How much do info you allow in when you are subjective?
e. No
Distinction between voluntary and involuntary
Felony
Murder Rule
I.
Death occurring during course of felony or fleeing the
felony is murder – strict liability
a. Must
be inherently dangerous felony to qualify
i. Generally,
the doctrine is too broad
b. Transferred
intent – culpable mens rea for felony gets transferred to murder (imputation of
mens rea that does not actually exist)
c. Regina v. Serne: D set house on fire and son dies; guilty
of murder b/c he committed felony
II.
Proximate Cause Theory
a. Not
just the “but for” cause but a proximate cause of the death
III.
“In furtherance” or “agency” theory
a. killing
must be in furtherance of the crime
b. person
responsible for his actions or the actions of his accomplice
IV.
Ideas behind Felony Murder Rule:
a. Deters
people from engaging in felonies or engaging in risky behavior while committing
a felony
b. Causal
theory: A D that engages in risky behavior should be responsible for any result
of that behavior, even if unintended
c. Foreseeability:
D should know this could happen
V.
MPC
: limits felony murder rule to cases of robbery, rape, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, felonious escape
a. MPC
is very limiting on the rule
b. Assumes
reckless disregard for human life
c. Burden
of proof falls to defendant to show he is not brutal, malicious killer
VI.
Co-Felons
a. Once
you accept felony murder rule, complicity theory will make co-felons
accountable
b. State v. Canola: (NJ 1977) D not guilty of murder when
co-felon was killed by the victim of their robbery
i. majority
rule: only guilty if co-felon is killed as a result of D’s actions during
felony
ii. agency
theory
c. Taylor v.
Superior Court: (CA 1970): D
was guilty when victim of robbery killed co-felon
i. co-felons
were responsible for provoking resistance; had mens rea of conscious disregard
for human life and thus malice
VII.
Can be different from complicity because in complicity
you might not have the requisite intent to be convicted, but you could be
convicted under felony murder
The Significance of Resulting Harm
Causation
- Prosecutor must prove cause in fact and proximate cause
- Common law approach (more accepted)
- But for cause
- Proximate Cause
- Is there an intervening cause?
- If so, is it superseding (breaks connection and D is not liable)
- Remoteness and foreseeability are factors
- MPC §2.03
- MPC §2.03(2)(b): Purpose/knowledge “the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense.”
Cause in Fact
I.
“But for” cause
II.
“Substantial factor” test
a. does
not have to be the act that definitely caused death if it contributed heavily
b. Murder
victim must be alive at time of act
Proximate Cause
I.
Is the connection between the act and the harm related
enough to hold D liable?
a. Scientific,
moral
b. Can
be multiple proximate causes
c. Criminal
law requires a more substantial connection than tort law because of basis on
moral fault and punishment
i. Commonwealth v. Root
d. Unintended
Victims: doctrine of transferred intent – D’s intent is transferred from the
actual to the intended victim
i. Supported
by MPC §2.03(2)(a)
ii. Applies
only where the intended result occurs, not in attempt crimes
e. Foreseeablity
II.
MPC:
“is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just]
bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense.”
a. No
intervening actors in MPC
III.
Foreseeability
a. If
result is foreseeable, there is crime
b. Mechanical
or scientific
c. People v. Acosta: helicopter crash while following police
chase, debate over foreseeability, found him to be proximate cause (events
foreseeable) but not convicted b/c of lack of malice (no mens rea)
d. People v. Arzon: two fires, fireman dies b/c of 2nd
fire, D started the 1st fire, still convicted b/c sufficiently
direct cause, foreseeability
IV.
Subsequent Human Actions – Intervening Cause
a. Intervening
cause:
i. If
it breaks causal connection it is a superseding cause which gets rid of
liability
b. People v. Campbell: D gave gun to deceased hoping he would
kill himself b/c deceased slept w/ D’s wife (both men drunk), deceased killed
himself, D not guilty of murder b/c he did not do the killing – deceased action
was superseding cause
c. People v.
Kevorkian: assisted suicide
where women took the final steps to commit suicide, issue is extent to which he
made it possible for them to kill themselves, court tries to distinguish
between aiding and participating (no clear line)
i. Generally
assisted suicide is not murder but its own offense
d. Stephenson v. State: woman abducted and abused, tries to
commit suicide, kidnapper takes home after she swallows pills, court rules that
victim’s actions were not superseding cause b/c victim was under D’s control
i. Court
seems to be saying that it is not a superseding cause unless the victim does
something that is completely unforeseeable
ii. Superseding
cause in this case not volitional
V.
Subsequent Human Actions that Recklessly Risk the
Result
a. Drag
racing/Russian Roulette cases
i. Manslaughter
b. Ask
about foreseeability, superseding cause
c. Bring
in moral arguments
d. Commonwealth v. Root: involuntary manslaughter? Drag racing, one racer swerved and
killed self, other driver not found guilty, victim’s action a superseding cause
b/c he recklessly chose to swerve into a head-on collision
i. Majority
rejects foreseeability but dissent says D helped create the dangerous situation
and should be guilty
e. State v. McFadden: involuntary manslaughter? Drag racing, victim killed self and
innocent people when he went into oncoming traffic, court looks more at
foreseeability and convicts D
f. Commonwealth v. Attencio: Russian
roulette, D guilty of manslaughter, inherent difference between Russian
roulette and drag racing b/c purpose of Russian roulette is for someone to die
Attempt
- Mens rea:
- the mens rea required for the substantive crime
- Must also intend the act, which, if carried out, would have resulted in commission of the crime
- Common law draws later line for actus reus than MPC (makes it harder to convict but less likely to arrest someone that would change mind)
- Idea that you do not want to punish for thought
- Competes with ideas that thought/intent speaks to culpability and you want to be able to prevent crimes
Mens Rea
I.
Common Law
a. D
must have the same mens rea required for acts which, if they had been carried
out, would have resulted in the commission of the crime
b. D
must intend
i. To
do the act (conduct)
ii. To
accomplish the result
iii. Under
the same circumstances (must know the circumstance of target offense)
II.
MPC
§5.01(1)
a. Same
mens rea as required for commission of the crime
b. Did
D have
i. Conduct:
Purpose
ii. Result:
Knowledge or Purpose (this makes it easier to convict for attempt)
iii. Circumstance
: whatever mens rea is required for commission of completed crime (First, you
would look at the statute)
III.
Smallwood v. State:
HIV+ man rapes 3 women, attempted murder? No b/c he did not intend that they
would be killed, only recklessly disregarded the possibility (result element)
IV.
Generally, there is no crime of attempted manslaughter
b/c manslaughter has a reckless or
result and not intended
Actus Reus: Preparation v.
Attempt
I.
Do not want to punish for thought when there is the
chance the person will change mind
II.
Tests: Proximity, MPC
III.
Common Law (Proximity Test): Mere preparation is not
enough, must wait until last step before crime is committed to be an attempt
crime
a. Question
is what is yet to be done?
b. People v. Rizzo: bank robbery plan, Ds not guilty b/c they
were not far enough along in the robbery under the proximity test
c. No
abandonment
IV.
MPC Approach: §5.01(1)(c) – substantial step toward commission
of crime test; increases ability to move in before crime (more followed)
a. Question
is what has been done – is it enough to show firm intent?
b. U.S. v. Jackson: followed MPC in attempted robbery case,
said there was substantial step
c. Abandonment:
allowed under MPC as affirmative defense for people who truly voluntarily
abandon the crimes
Impossibility
- Different from mistake of fact/mistake of law b/c it deals more with whether result can occur than the mens rea of each element
- Defense to attempt
I.
Factual impossibility: D would have committed offense
if not for mistake of fact
a. Had
the facts been as D believed them to be, there would have been a crime so the
mens rea is there
b. Ex:
pickpocket who tries to take wallet but there is no wallet there, loaded v.
unloaded gun
c. This
is NOT a valid defense
II.
Legal Impossibility: true or mistake of fact re: legal
relationship
a. True
Legal Impossibility: Even had the facts been as the D believed them to be,
there would not have been a crime – mistake about how the crime is defined
i. D
not guilty in these cases
b. Mistake
of fact relating to legal relationship: mistake about whether the facts bring
D’s behavior into the statute
i. People v. Jaffe: D tried to buy stolen goods but they were not actually
stolen, court said there was legal impossibility and acquitted
ii. Can
use as a defense
III.
MPC
§5.01(a): it is an attempt to “purposely engage in conduct which would
constitute a crime if the attendant circumstances were as [the defendant]
believes them to be”
a. Eliminates
distinction between legal and factual impossibility
b. Eliminates
impossibility as defense except in cases of true legal impossibility
c. Considers
mens rea
d. Also
makes punishment for attempt same as punishment for crime (not sure which §)
b/c culpability based on intent
e. Current
majority position
f. People v. Dlugash: one man shoots victim, D then shoots victim,
prosecution could not prove D thought victim was alive when D shot him, so
there was no proof of what he thought circumstances were, not guilty of attempt
Group Criminality: Complicity
- Holding accomplice accountable for actions of another during a crime
- D must intend to aid in the principal act
- If accomplice has the requisite mens rea, you impute the act of the principal actor – you do not impute mens rea
- (Different from felony murder, where if the D has the requisite mens rea, you impute the mens rea for murder)
- Broad doctrine
- Balances holding people accountable for the risk they caused and the level of involvement in creating the risky situation
Requirements
I.
The D aided or abetted (actus reus)
a. D
must have directly or indirectly encouraged or facilitated the commission of
the offense
b. Under
MPC, attempt to aid
is enough, whereas under common law you actually have to aid the person (most
states follow common law here)
c. Remember,
there is no “but for” element – no need the prove the crime would not have been
committed “but for” the aid
II.
D Had the requisite mens rea
a. Mens
rea for the crime required
i. Result:
kind of culpability sufficient for the commission of the offense as provided in
the definition of the substantive crime
1. as
long as you intend to aid, there is no purpose/intent for the result (can be
troublesome)
2. remember
the cleaning the gun example – knowledge of use of the gun often enough to
convict
ii. Had
Purpose (Intent to aid) – act with an affirmative desire that his acts have an
encouraging or assisting effect.
This promotes or facilitates the crime/ purpose to promote commission of
crime/ assist party to engage in conduct that forms the basis of the offense
1. once
you aid, you can impute the conduct of the principal actor
III.
The person abetted or incited actually committed the
offense
Mens Rea
I.
Actions of the Principal
a. Hicks v. U.S.: one man kills another, D used encouraging
words; if D intended to encourage murder, the action is imputed to him
b. State v. Gladstone: D told other person where he could buy
marijuana, had no purpose to aid the principal in selling marijuana (the crime)
even though knew it could happen, so not guilty
i. Knowledge
not enough, need purpose
c. People v.
Luparello: D looking for
ex-girlfriend, henchmen kill the guy who might be able to locate her
i. They
convicted him based on imputing the purpose of the henchmen but this DOES NOT
follow the MPC b/c he did not have purpose in relation to the commission of the
crime (murder)
II.
Attendant Circumstances
a. U.S. v. Xavier: brother gives ex-felon brother a gun, which
he uses for murder. Did non-felon
brother aid ex-felon in acquiring firearm? Said he did not know, so not convicted
III.
Result
a. People v. McVay: convicted of aiding manslaughter based on
aiding in commission of grossly negligent act
b. People v. Russell: 3 kids shooting guns, no proof as to
which killed the principal – all convicted b/c all had the necessary mens rea
for murder
IV.
Drag racing and complicity
a. Accomplice
has to intend to aid the principal actor in the activity; question becomes
which activity – in drag racing the accomplice intends to aid the drag racing,
but not the murder/manslaughter
V.
Dangerous activity
a. State v. Ayers: no complicity for
involuntary manslaughter when selling gun to 16 year old without permit
b. State v. Travis: complicity for involuntary manslaughter when D let 15-yr.
old drive defective motorcycle in area w/ lots of kids around
c. The
theory for holding an accomplice liable in dangerous activity is that they
aided the principal actor in the dangerous activity. They risked the death of someone by aiding in the dangerous
activity
d. There
is also an element of closeness to the actual activity that distinguishes these
cases (idea of fairness); court seems to raise the aid requirement in instances
of recklessness and negligence
Actus Reus
I.
Wilcox v. Jeffery:
convicted for aiding when man went to watch a man illegally play instrument
even though he did not encourage him
a.
Most states will rule differently than here b/c
there was no actual aid
II.
State v. Tally: telegram
case, telegram aided the brothers in committing murder, so he is guilty of
murder as well
Exculpation
·
All elements of the crime are there, but D not
held accountable
Justification
v. Excuse
I.
Justification: admit that D did something but say that
it was a good or sensible action – morally right to commit the crime, better
that D committed the crime
a. Self
defense
II.
Excuse: admit action was bad but D does not accept full
(or any) responsibility
a. Insanity,
forced to commit crime
Self
Defense
I.
MPC §3.04
a. (1):
“use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against he use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion”
b. (2)(b):
“the use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor
believes such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious
bodily harm, etc.”
i. allows
unreasonable or reasonable mistake when deciding how much force is necessary to
defend
II.
Common law: allows a reasonable mistake in relation to
justification, but not an unreasonable mistake
III.
Balance: do not want an unreasonable belief to
exonerate a person, but maybe you want to mitiage culpability based on a
person’s belief they were in danger
IV.
People v. Goetz:
systematic shooting of boys in NY subway, not guilty based on self defense
a. Used
a reasonable man standard as to whether a reasonable man would believe he had
to use deadly force in the D’s situation (rather than MPC’s allowance of
mistake related to force necessary to defend)
b. This
case brings up a lot if issues relating to stereotyping
V.
Battered Women
a. State v. Kelly: D kills husband with scissors and claims
self defense, history of abuse, court ruled that expert testimony should be
allowed b/c it would educate jury about D’s state of mind
i. brings
in the idea of allowing expert witnesses in order to educate the jury
b. Differentiation
between woman who kills husband while fighting or when he is not expecting it
No comments:
Post a Comment